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Abstract
We compare here the relative strength of four widely used proce-
dures on finite strategic games: iterated elimination of weakly/strictly
dominated strategies by a pure/mixed strategy. A complication is that
none of these procedures is based on a monotonic operator. To deal
with this problem we use ’global’ versions of these operators.
1 Introduction
In the literature four procedures of reducing finite strategic games have been
widely studied: iterated elimination of weakly/strictly dominated strategies by
a pure/mixed strategy. Denote the corresponding operators (the mnemonics
should be clear, ’L’ refers to ’local’ the meaning of which will be clarified later)
respectively by LW, MLW, LS and MLS. When these operators are applied to
a specific game G we get the following obvious inclusions:
MLW(G)⊆ LW(G)⊆ LS(G) and MLW(G)⊆MLS(G)⊆ LS(G).
It is then natural to expect that these inclusions carry on to the outcomes
of the iterations of these operators. It turns out that this is not completely
true. Moreover, proofs of some of the apparently obvious implications are not,
in our view, completely straightforward. One of the complications is that none
of these operators is monotonic. To reason about them we use their ‘global’
versions.
More precisely, given two strategy elimination operators Φl and Ψl such
that for all games G, Φl(G)⊆Ψl(G) we prove the inclusion Φ
ω
l ⊆Ψ
ω
l between
the outcomes of their iterations by means of the following generic procedure:
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(i) define the corresponding ‘global’ versions of these operators, Φg and Ψg,
(ii) prove that Φωg = Φ
ω
l and Ψ
ω
g = Ψ
ω
l ,
(iii) show that for all games G, Φg(G)⊆Ψg(G),
(iv) show that at least one of Φg and Ψg is monotonic.
The last two steps then imply Φωg ⊆Ψ
ω
g by a general lemma. The desired
inclusion Φωl ⊆Ψ
ω
l then follows by (ii). The main work is in proving (ii).
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Strategic games
By a strategic game (in short, a game) for n players (n > 1) we mean a
sequence
(S1, . . ., Sn, p1, . . ., pn),
where for each i ∈ [1..n]
• Si is the non-empty, finite set of strategies available to player i,
• pi is the payoff function for the player i, so pi : S1 × . . . × Sn →R,
where R is the set of real numbers.
Given a sequence of sets of strategies S1, . . ., Sn and s ∈ S1 × . . .× Sn we
denote the ith element of s by si, denote (s1, . . ., si−1, si+1, . . ., sn) by s−i and
similarly with S−i, and write (s
′
i, s−i) for (s1, . . ., si−1, s
′
i, si+1, . . ., sn), where
we assume that s′i ∈ Si. We denote the strategies of player i by si, possibly
with some superscripts.
Given a finite non-empty set A we denote by ∆A the set of probability
distributions over A and call any element of ∆Si a mixed strategy of player
i. The payoff functions are extended in the standard way to mixed strategies.
We say that G := (S1, . . ., Sn) is a restriction of a game H := (T1, . . ., Tn,
p1, . . ., pn) if each Si is a (possibly empty) subset of Ti. We identify the restric-
tion (T1, . . ., Tn) with H . A subgame of H is a restriction (S1, . . ., Sn) with
all Si non-empty.
To analyze various ways of iterated elimination of strategies from an initial
game H we view such procedures as operators on the set of subgames of H . A
minor complication is that this set together with the componentwise inclusion
on the players’ strategy sets does not form a lattice. Consequently, we extend
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these operators to the set of all restrictions of H , which together with the
componentwise set inclusion does form a lattice.
Given a restriction G := (S1, . . ., Sn) of H = (T1, . . ., Tn, p1, . . ., pn) and two
strategies si ∈ Ti and mi ∈ ∆Ti we write mi ≻G si as an abbreviation for
∀s−i ∈ S−i pi(mi, s−i) > pi(si, s−i)
and mi ≻
w
G si as an abbreviation for
∀s−i ∈ S−i pi(mi, s−i) ≥ pi(si, s−i) ∧ ∃s−i ∈ S−i pi(mi, s−i) > pi(si, s−i).
In the first case we say that si is strictly dominated on G by mi and in
the second one that si is weakly dominated on G by mi. In particular mi
can be a pure strategy, i.e. an element of Ti.
Given an operator T on a finite lattice (D, ⊆ ) we denote by T k the k-fold
iteration of T , where T 0 = D (so the iterations start ’at the top’) and let
T ω := ∩k≥0T
k. We call T monotonic if for all G,G′
G⊆G′ implies T (G)⊆ T (G′).
When comparing two ways of eliminating strategies from a strategic game,
represented by the operators T and U on the lattice of all restrictions of H ,
we would like to deduce T ω ⊆ Uω from the fact that for all G, T (G)⊆ U(G).
Unfortunately, in general this implication does not hold; a revealing example
is provided in Section 4. What does hold is the following simple lemma that
relates to steps (iii) and (iv) of the generic procedure from the Introduction
and reveals the importance of the monotonicity.
Lemma 1 Consider two operators T and U on a finite lattice (D, ⊆ ), such
that
• for all G, T (G)⊆ U(G),
• at least one of T and U is monotonic.
Then T ω ⊆ Uω.
Proof. We prove by induction that for all k ≥ 0 we have T k ⊆ Uk. The claim
holds for k = 0. Suppose it holds for some k. Then by the assumptions and the
induction hypothesis we have the following string of inclusions and equalities:
• if T is monotonic: T k+1 = T (T k)⊆ T (Uk)⊆ U(Uk) = Uk+1,
• if U is monotonic: T k+1 = T (T k)⊆ U(T k)⊆ U(Uk) = Uk+1. ✷
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3 Strict dominance
From now we fix an initial game H = (T1, . . ., Tn, p1, . . ., pn). Given a restric-
tion G := (S1, . . ., Sn) of H we denote Si by Gi. In particular we denote Ti by
Hi.
First we focus on two operators on the restrictions of H :
LS(G) := G′,
where for all i ∈ [1..n]
G′i := {si ∈ Gi | ¬∃s
′
i ∈ Gi s
′
i ≻G si},
and MLS defined analogously but with G′i := {si ∈ Gi | ¬∃mi ∈ ∆Gi mi ≻G
si}.
Starting with Luce and Raiffa [1957], the iterated elimination of strictly
dominated strategies is customarily defined as the outcome of the iteration of
the MLS operator starting with the initial game H .
To reason about the above two operators we introduce two related operators
defined by (’G’ stands for ‘global’):
GS(G) := G′
where for all i ∈ [1..n]
G′i := {si ∈ Gi | ¬∃s
′
i ∈ Hi s
′
i ≻G si}.
and MGS defined analogously but with G′i := {si ∈ Gi | ¬∃mi ∈ ∆Hi mi ≻G
si}.
So in the LS and MLS operators we limit our attention to strict dominance
by a pure/mixed strategy in the current game, G, while in the other two
operators we consider strict dominance by a pure/mixed strategy in the initial
game, H .
The difference is crucial because the operators LS and MLS are not mono-
tonic, while GS and MGS are. To see the former just take the following game
H :
X
A 1, 0
B 0, 0
Note that LS(H)=MLS(H)=({A}, {X}) and LS({B}, {X})=MLS({B}, {X})
= ({B}, {X}). So ({B}, {X})⊆H , while neither LS({B}, {X})⊆ LS(H) nor
MLS({B}, {X})⊆MLS(H).
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Monotonicity of GS and MGS follows directly from their definitions. The
MGS operator is studied in Brandenburger, Friedenberg and Keisler [2006b]
(it is their operator Φ) and in Apt [2007b]. For the case of strict dominance
by a pure strategy it was introduced for arbitrary games in Milgrom and
Roberts [1990, pages 1264-1265], studied for compact games with continuous
payoffs in Ritzberger [2001, Section 5.1] and considered for arbitrary games
in the presence of transfinite iterations in Chen, Long and Luo [2005] and
Apt [2007b].
The fact that the MGS operator is monotonic has some mathematical ad-
vantages. For example, by virtue of a general result established in Apt [2007b],
it is automatically order independent. Moreover, thanks to monotonicity, as
argued in Apt [2007a], it can be used in the epistemic framework of game
theory based on possibility correspondences as ‘a stand alone’ concept of ra-
tionality.
The following result, the second part of which was proved (as Proposition
2.2 (ii)) in Brandenburger, Friedenberg and Keisler [2006b], relates the original
operators to their global versions and corresponds to step (ii) of the generic
procedure from the Introduction.
Lemma 2 GSω = LSω and MGSω = MLSω.
Proof. See the appendix. ✷
This allows us to establish the expected inclusion.
Theorem 1 MLSω ⊆ LSω.
Proof. This is a consequence of the mentioned generic procedure, since step
(iii) holds: for all restrictions G, MGS(G)⊆GS(G), and step (iv) holds: both
MGS and GS are monotonic. ✷
4 Weak dominance
Next we compare the LS and MLS operators with their weak dominance coun-
terparts, LW and MLW, defined in the same way, but using the ≻wG relation
instead of ≻G. In the literature, starting with Luce and Raiffa [1957], the iter-
ated elimination of weakly dominated strategies is customarily defined as the
outcome of the iteration of the MLW operator starting with the initial game
H .
To reason about these two operators we use the corresponding ‘global’
versions, GW and MGW, defined in the same way as for strict dominance. We
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have following counterpart of Lemma 2, the second part of which was proved
(as Lemma F.1) in Brandenburger, Friedenberg and Keisler [2006a].
Lemma 3 GWω = LWω and MGWω = MLWω.
Proof. See the appendix. ✷
This allows us to establish the following result.
Theorem 2 LWω ⊆ LSω and MLWω ⊆MLSω.
Proof. Again, this is a consequence of the generic procedure from the Intro-
duction. Indeed, step (iii) holds: for all restrictions G, GW(G)⊆GS(G) and
MGW(G)⊆MGS(G), and step (iv) holds: both GS and MGS are monotonic.
✷
However, surprisingly, the inclusion MLWω ⊆ LWω does not hold.
Example 1 Consider the following game H :
X Y Z
A 2, 1 0, 1 1, 0
B 0, 1 2, 1 1, 0
C 1, 1 1, 0 0, 0
D 1, 0 0, 1 0, 0
Applying to it the MLW operator we get
X Y
A 2, 1 0, 1
B 0, 1 2, 1
Another application of MLW yields no change. In contrast, after three itera-
tions of the LW operator to the initial game we reach
X
A 2, 1
✷
Since the conclusion of Lemma 1 does not apply here, while Lemma 3
holds, we conclude that none of the operators LW,MLW,GW and MGW is
monotonic.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2.
This result is a corollary to Theorem 5 of Apt [2007b]. We provide here a
direct proof. Note first that for all restrictions G we have GS(G)⊆ LS(G) so
by Lemma 1 we have GSω ⊆ LSω.
To establish the first equality we prove by induction that for all k ≥ 0
LSk ⊆GSk.
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We only need to establish the induction step. Take si ∈ LS
k+1
i . By definition
si ∈ LS
k
i and ¬∃s
′
i ∈ LS
k
i s
′
i ≻LSk si. By the induction hypothesis si ∈ GS
k
i .
Let
A := {s′i ∈ Hi | s
′
i ≻LSk si}.
Suppose by contradiction that A 6= ∅. Choose a maximal element s∗i ∈ A
w.r.t. the ≻
LS
k ordering on A. Then for all l ∈ [0..k], s∗i ∈ LS
l
i, so in particular
s∗i ∈ LS
k
i , which contradicts the assumption about si. So A = ∅, which implies
by the induction hypothesis that ¬∃s′i ∈ Hi s
′
i ≻GSk si. So si ∈ GS
k+1
i . ✷
Proof of Lemma 3.
We prove by induction that for all k ≥ 0
LWk = GWk.
Again, we only need to establish the induction step. We prove first that
LWk+1 ⊆GWk+1. Take si ∈ LW
k+1
i . By the induction hypothesis LW
k =
GWk, so si ∈ GW
k
i . Let
A := {s′i ∈ Hi | s
′
i ≻LWk si}.
Suppose by contradiction that A 6= ∅. Define the function index : A→ [0..k]
by
index(s′i) :=
{
k if s′i ∈ LW
k
i
j if s′i ∈ LW
j
i \ LW
j+1
i
Let B be the set of elements of A with the maximal index, i.e.,
B = argmax
s′i∈A
index(s′i).
Let now j0 be the index of the elements in B and s
∗
i a maximal element of B
w.r.t. the ≻w
LW
j0
ordering on B.
Note that j0 = k. Indeed, otherwise s
∗
i 6∈ LW
j0+1
i . Then for some s
′′
i ∈ LW
j0
i
we have s′′i ≻
w
LW
j0
s∗i . But s
∗
i ≻LWk si and LW
k ⊆ LWj0, so s′′i ≻
w
LW
k si. Hence
s′′i ∈ B, which contradicts the choice of s
∗
i .
So j0 = k, which means that s
∗
i ∈ LW
k
i and s
∗
i ≻
w
LW
k si. But this contradicts
the fact that si ∈ LW
k+1
i . So A = ∅, which implies by the induction hypothesis
that ¬∃s′i ∈ Hi s
′
i ≻
w
GW
k si. So si ∈ GW
k+1
i .
Next we prove that GWk+1 ⊆ LWk+1. Take si ∈ GW
k+1
i . Then si ∈ GW
k
i =
LWki . Also ¬∃s
′
i ∈ Hi s
′
i ≻
w
GW
k si, so ¬∃s
′
i ∈ LW
k
i s
′
i ≻
w
GW
k si, so by the
induction hypothesis ¬∃s′i ∈ LW
k
i s
′
i ≻
w
LW
k si, which means that si ∈ LW
k+1
i .
✷
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